[NOTE(8/19/2003): this post was supposed to have been published yesterday]

After almost a year of blogging, being unable to do so from home due to computer trouble was kinda jarring. Since my employer monitors employee Internet usage, I'm not able to get the usual quantity of news and current happenings during the day...and most of that lost time is made up at home. With my PC down, all I could do was drink, watch movies, read the newspaper, or read books. And hang out with friends, work on my car, and help my family out with a few things.

Hmmm. Seems I could be doing quite a bit more than just putzing around online, posting about things that tick me off. But screw all that, there's so much to talk about I'm picking something at random to start with.

A while back, I was at my parents' house and ran across a book called Why We Were in Vietnam by Norman Podhoretz. Aside from the mild historical dusting I recieved from high school, I really didn't have much knowledge of the Vietnam War. My father served several tours. I was well aware there was tremendous opposition to it near the end of the 60's and through the early 70's. I knew we "lost" in the sense the North Vietnamese Communists overran the South. And I knew the French were there from the beginning as colonialists. But beyond some other major things like the Tet Offensive, Gulf of Tonkin, and only the barest of general overviews of the politicians involved, I was mostly in the dark.

So I asked my dad if I could borrow it and he let me. I took it home and got through the first 25 or so pages and set it aside to do something else. And that's how it lay for the next several months, alone and neglected. During a visit, a friend asked if I knew "why we were in Vietnam" and I had to reply I wasn't sure - I hadn't read the book yet. :)

But during my downtime, it drew me back and almost asked to be read. This may be partially due to the regular mention of the failures of Vietnam the current anti-war generation uses and has used when discussing the recent Iraq war. I don't like being ignorant, so I dove back into the book.

I have to agree: it was an excellent and clear read from beginning to end. Mr. Podhoretz in effect creates a concise and interesting Clif Notes history lesson on what lead to the war, why we entered it, why we stayed, and why we left. Though it is slightly troublesome he relies heavily on the memoirs of the politicians he discusses (particularly Johnson, Nixon, and Kissinger) when attempting to shed light on their true motivations, in the end, I felt his analysis was robust and even-handed. It felt considerably more informed after finishing the book, not in small part due to his emphasis on the driving forces, philosophy and ideology, and movtivations of the main US characters throughout the conflict.

Amazon.com says it's out of print and that's a shame. It is written with a clear anti-Communist bias (something I don't consider a problem), it is intended as a defense of the reason we went to Vietnam (i.e., to contain the spread of Communism and to effectively demonstrate this was the very intention of Kennedy/Johnson/Nixon all along), and is a direct attack on those who went far further than just opposing the methods and tactics used, but I would feel quite confortable using this short (it's only 219 pages plus notes and citations) book as a primer for anyone who is new or shady in their knowledge of the war. It was a fun and involving read.

Now, did reading it change my opinion of the war itself? First of all, I never had a clear opinion of the war. I certainly support the idea of containing and rolling back Communism and Socialism, provided they present a threat to myself, my country, and my allies. So the great question is, would a Communist Vietnamese victory present a danger? The book touches upon this question, but doesn't delve into it deeply, focusing on the politics surrounding it. Mr. Podhoretz does covey a convincing arguement that a significant number of American politicians and pundits believed so, in the general form of the Domino Theory, which states that once a country is taken over by Communism, it is almost inevitable that it's surrounding neighbors will also fall like a row of dominoes.

Strictly speaking, I can't put stock in a theory that bases itself on a premise that relies on an outcome that cannot be altered, otherwise known as Fate. Predestination has never been a part of my belief system, so the Domino Theory isn't something I'd use as part of an arguement for fighting Vietnam. Practically speaking, however, I can clearly understand the seriousness of the historical context. In the 50's, the world seemed to become more and more Communist as time went along. North Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam, eastern Europe...I can understand how American politicians would assume this would occur inevitably if nothing was done.

Interestingly, Mr. Podhoretz maintains a fairly balanced presentation during these policy discussions. He himself was not in favor of American involvement in Vietnam, but he did and still does support at least the containment of Communism. In the end, though, the great faith the US politicians placed in the Domino Theory isn't something I can use to justify American involvement.

One of the most interesting things I learned from this book was the emergence of the Chinese-Soviet split. That in itself changed the landscape significantly. It would make a difference if the more-radical Chinese backed the North Vietnamese than the slowly calming Soviet Russians. Of course, part of the problem back then was the vast number of people didn't have access to good factual reporting, something Mr. Podhoretz spends quite a bit of time on from the middle onward. This is where he does his best, exposing the sheer lying absurdity some of the war's critics and reporters engaged in. This alone is worth the price of getting ahold of the book, to counterbalance the taken-for-granted negative deadweight the term "Vietnam" brings along with it's use.

But would I have supported the war back then? I can't say for certain because the crucial question of the threat an unmolested Communist Vietnam might have presented isn't something I can answer at this time. Obviously, once we lost and they took over the rest of the nation, nothing resembling a new threat appeared towards the US as far as I am aware of. But I do agree with Mr. Podhoretz in that the central goal of the policy that was used to justify intervention was a worthy one: putting the brakes on the spread of evangelistic Communism.